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Abstract
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion
games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria
is guaranteed by potential function arguments. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and
computing pure Nash equilibria is such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit
weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in
this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist.
Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. Do
such equilibria exist? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?
We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial la-
tency functions by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games that
we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate pure Nash equilibria,
where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient
algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with
linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+
√
5
2 + O(γ) for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for
latency functions with maximum degree d ≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial in the
number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also
show the following interesting structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial la-
tency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from
any initial state to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in
such games as long as d is constant.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure
Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work on
unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating non-potential
games by potential ones seems to be novel and might have further applications.
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1 Introduction
Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory.
Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no
player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff.
Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. Furhermore, even
in games where the existence of equilibria is guaranteed, their computation can be a computationally hard
task. Such negative results significantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution concepts
that characterize the behavior of rational players.
Approximate pure Nash equilibria, which characterize situations where no player can significantly im-
prove her payoff by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy, could serve as alternative solution con-
cepts1 provided that they exist and can be computed efficiently. In this paper, we present the first positive
algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our main contri-
bution is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria under mild
restrictions on the game parameters; these restrictions apply to important subclasses of games in which not
even the existence of such approximate equilibria was known prior to our work.
Problem statement and related work. In a weighted congestion game, players compete over a set of
resources. Each player has a positive weight. Each resource incurs a latency to all players that use it; this
latency depends on the total weight of the players that use the resource according to a resource-specific, non-
negative, and non-decreasing latency function. Among a given set of strategies (over sets of resources), each
player aims to select one selfishly, trying to minimize her individual total cost, i.e., the sum of the latencies
on the resources in her strategy. Typical examples include weighted congestion games in networks, where
the network links correspond to the resources and each player has alternative paths that connect two nodes as
strategies.
The case of unweighted congestion games (i.e., when all players have unit weight) has been widely
studied in literature. Rosenthal [27] proved that these games admit a potential function with the following
remarkable property: the difference in the potential value between two states (i.e., two snapshots of strategies)
that differ in the strategy of a single player equals to the difference of the cost experienced by this player in
these two states. This immediately implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Any sequence of
improvement moves by the players strictly decreases the value of the potential and a state corresponding to
a local minimum of the potential will eventually be reached; this corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium.
For weighted congestion games, potential functions exist only in the case where the latency functions are
linear or exponential (see [17, 21, 26]). Actually, in games with polynomial latency functions (of constant
maximum degree higher than 1), pure Nash equilibria may not exist [21]. In general, the problem of deciding
whether a given weighted congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard [15].
Potential functions provide only inefficient proofs of existence of pure Nash equilibria. Fabrikant et al.
[18] proved that the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium in a (unweighted) congestion game is
PLS-complete (informally, as hard as it could be given that there is an associated potential function; see
[22]). This negative result holds even in the case of linear latency functions [1]. One consequence of PLS-
completeness results is that almost all states in some congestion games are such that any sequence of players’
improvement moves that originates from these states and reaches pure Nash equilibria is exponentially long.
Such phenomena have been observed even in very simple weighted congestion games (see [2, 16]). Efficient
algorithms are known only for special cases. For example, Fabrikant et al. [18] show that the Rosenthal’s
potential function can be (globally) minimized efficiently by a flow computation in unweighted congestion
games in networks when the strategy sets of the players are symmetric.
1Actually, approximate pure Nash equilibria may be more desirable as solution concepts in practical decision making settings
since they can accommodate small modeling inaccuracies due to uncertainty (e.g., see the arguments in [12]).
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The above negative results have led to the study of the complexity of approximate pure Nash equilibria
(or, simply, approximate equilibria). A ρ-approximate (pure Nash) equilibrium is a state, from which no
player has an incentive to deviate so that she decreases her cost by a factor larger than ρ. In our recent work
[7], we present an algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate equilibria for unweighted congestion games
with polynomial latency functions of constant maximum degree. The restriction on the latency functions is
necessary since, for more general latency functions, Skopalik and Vo¨cking [28] show that the problem is
still PLS-complete for any polynomially computable ρ (see also the discussion in [7]). Improved bounds are
known for special cases. For symmetric unweighted congestion games, Chien and Sinclair [11] prove that the
(1+ ǫ)-improvement dynamics converges to a (1+ ǫ)-approximate equilibrium after a polynomial number of
steps; this result holds under mild assumptions on the latency functions and the participation of the players in
the dynamics. Efficient algorithms for approximate equilibria have been recently obtained for other classes
of games such as constraint satisfaction [5, 25], anonymous games [14], network formation [3], and facility
location games [8].
In light of the negative results mentioned above, several authors have considered other properties of the
dynamics of congestion games. The papers [4, 19, 20] consider the question of whether efficient states (in the
sense that the total cost of the players, or social cost, is small compared to the optimum one) can be reached by
best-response moves in linear weighted congestion games. In particular, Awerbuch et al. [4] show that using
almost unrestricted sequences of (1 + ǫ)-improvement best-response moves, the players rapidly converge to
efficient states. Unfortunately, these states are not approximate equilibria, in general. Similar approaches
have been followed in the context of other games as well, such as multicast [9, 10], cut [13], and valid-utility
games [24].
Our contribution. To the best of our knowledge, no efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria
is known for (any broad enough subclass of) weighted congestion games. We fill this gap by presenting an
algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial latency
functions of constant maximum degree. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee
is 3+
√
5
2 + O(γ) for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d).
The algorithm runs in time that is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ.
This result is much more surprising than it looks at first glance. In particular, weighted congestion
games with superlinear latency functions do not admit potential functions, the main tool that is exploited
by all known positive algorithmic results for (approximate) equilibria in congestion games. Given this, it
is not even clear that O(1)-approximate equilibria exist. In order to bypass this obstacle, we introduce a
new class of potential games (that we call Ψ-games), which “approximate” weighted congestion games with
polynomial latency functions in the following sense. Ψ-games of degree 1 are linear weighted congestion
games. Each weighted congestion game of degree d ≥ 2 has a corresponding Ψ-game of degree d defined in
such a way that any ρ-approximate equilibrium in the latter is a d!ρ-approximate equilibrium for the former.
As an intermediate new result, we obtain that weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions
of degree d have d!-approximate equilibria.
So, our algorithm is actually applied to Ψ-games. It has a simple general structure, similar to our recent
algorithm for unweighted congestion games [7], but has also important differences that are due to the depen-
dency of the cost of each player on the weights of other players. Given a Ψ-game of degree d and an arbitrary
initial state, the algorithm computes a sequence of best-response player moves of length that is bounded by a
polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. The sequence consists of phases
so that the players that participate in each phase experience costs that are polynomially related. This is cru-
cial in order to obtain convergence in polynomial time. Within each phase, the algorithm coordinates the
best-response moves according to two different but simple criteria; this is the main tool that guarantees that
the effect of a phase to previous ones is negligible and, eventually, an approximate equilibrium is reached.
The approximation guarantee is slightly higher than a quantity that characterizes the potential functions of
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Ψ-games; this quantity (which we call the stretch) is defined as the worst-case ratio of the potential value
at an almost exact pure Nash equilibrium over the globally optimum potential value and is almost 3+
√
5
2 for
linear weighted congestion games and dd+o(d) for Ψ-games of degree d ≥ 2. Our analysis follows the same
main steps as in our recent paper [7] but uses significantly more involved arguments due to the definition of
Ψ-games.
We also present a similar but slightly inferior algorithm that is applied directly to weighted congestion
games of maximum degree d ≥ 2 and reveals a rather surprising structural property of their Nash dynamics:
starting from any initial state, the algorithm identifies a polynomially-long sequence of best-response moves
that lead to a dO(d2)-approximate equilibrium. Even though the definition of this algorithm does not make
any use of properties of Ψ-games, the analysis is heavily based on them, similarly to the analysis of our main
algorithm.
We remark that, following the classical definition of polynomial latency functions in the literature, we as-
sume that they have non-negative coefficients. This is a necessary limitation since the problem of computing
a ρ-approximate equilibrium in (unweighted) congestion games with linear latency functions with negative
offsets is PLS-complete for any polynomial-time computable ρ ≥ 1 [7].
Roadmap. We begin with preliminary general definitions in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to Ψ-games and
their properties. We present our algorithm and its analysis in Section 4 and conclude with open problems in
Section 5. Due to lack of space, most of the proofs as well as our structural result appears in Appendix.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
In general, a game can be defined as follows. It has a set of n players N ; each player u ∈ N has a set of
available strategies Σu. A snapshot of strategies, with one strategy per player, is called a state. Each state
S ∈ ∏u∈N Σu incurs a positive cost cu(S) to player u. Players act selfishly; each of them aims to select
a strategy that minimizes her cost, given the strategies of the other players. Given a state S and a strategy
s′u ∈ Σu for player u, we denote by (S−u, s′u) the state obtained from S when player u deviates to strategy
s′u. For a state S, an improvement move (or, simply, a move) for player u is the deviation to any strategy
s′u that (strictly) decreases her cost, i.e., cu(S−u, s′u) < cu(S). For ρ ≥ 1, such a move is called a ρ-move
if it satisfies cu(S−u, s′u) <
cu(S)
ρ . A best-response move is a move that minimizes the cost of the player
(of course, given the strategies of the other players). So, from state S, a move of player u to strategy su
is a best-response move (and is denoted by BRu(S)) when cu(S−u, s′u) = mins∈Σu cu(S−u, s). A state S
is called a pure Nash equilibrium (or, simply, an equilibrium) when cu(S) ≤ cu(S−u, s′u) for every player
u ∈ N and every strategy s′u ∈ Σu, i.e., when no player has a move. In this case, we say that no player
has (any incentive to make) a move. Similarly, a state is called a ρ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium
(henceforth called, simply, a ρ-approximate equilibrium) when no player has a ρ-move. Also, a state is
called a ρ-approximate equilibrium for a subset of players A ⊆ N if no player in A has a ρ-move. We use
the term Nash dynamics of a game in order to refer to the directed graph with nodes that correspond to the
possible states of the game and directed edges that indicate improvement player moves; pure Nash equilibria
correspond to sinks of the Nash dynamics.
A weighted congestion game G can be represented by the tuple (N,E, (wu)u∈N , (Σu)u∈N , (fe)e∈E).
There is a set of n players N and a set of resources E. Each player u has a positive weight wu and a set of
available strategies Σu; each strategy su in Σu consists of a non-empty set of resources, i.e., su ⊆ 2E . Each
resource e ∈ E has a non-negative and non-decreasing latency function fe defined over non-negative reals,
which denotes the latency incurred to the players using resource e; this latency depends on the total weight
of players whose strategies include the particular resource. For a state S, let us define Ne(S) to be the multi-
set of the weights of the players that use resource e in S, i.e., Ne(S) = {wu : u ∈ N such that e ∈ su}.
Also, we use the notation L(A) to denote the sum of the elements of a finite multi-set of reals A. Then,
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the latency incurred by resource e to a player u that uses it is fe(L(Ne(S))). The cost of a player u at
a state S is the total latency she experiences at the resources in her strategy su multiplied by her weight,
i.e., cu(S) = wu
∑
e∈su fe(L(Ne(S))). We consider weighted congestion games in which the resources
have polynomial latency functions with (integer) maximum degree d ≥ 1 with non-negative coefficients.
More precisely, the latency function of resource e is fe(x) =
∑d
k=0 ae,kx
k with ae,k ≥ 0. The special
case of linear weighted congestion games (i.e., with latency functions of degree 1) is of particular interest.
In general, the size of the representation of a weighted congestion game is the number of bits required to
represent the parameters ae,k of the latency functions, the weights of the players, and their strategy sets. In
weighted congestion games in networks, the network links are the resources. Each player u aims to connect
a pair of nodes (su, tu) and her strategies are all paths connecting su with tu in the network. Note that
the representation of such games does not need to keep the whole set of strategies explicitly; it just has to
represent the parameters ae,k, the weight and the source-destination node pair of each player, and the network.
Unweighted congestion games (i.e., when wu = 1 for each player u ∈ N ) as well as linear weighted
congestion games are potential games. They admit a potential function Φ : ∏uΣu 7→ R+, defined over all
states of the game, with the following property: for any two states S and (S−u, s′u) that differ only in the
strategy of player u, it holds that Φ(S−u, s′u) − Φ(S) = cu(S−u, s′u) − cu(S). Clearly, the local minima
of the potential function correspond to states that are pure Nash equilibria. The existence of a potential
function also implies that the Nash dynamics of the corresponding game is acyclic. Potential functions for
the two classes of games mentioned above have been presented by Rosenthal [27] and Fotakis et al. [17],
respectively. Unfortunately, weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of degree at least
2 are not potential games and may not even have pure Nash equilibria [21].
3 Ψ-games
Our aim in this section is to define a new class of games which we call Ψ-games and study their properties.
We will need the following interesting family of functions which have also been used in [6] in a slightly
different context.
Definition 3.1 For integer k ≥ 0, the function Ψk mapping finite multi-sets of reals to the reals is defined
as follows: Ψk(∅) = 0 for any integer k ≥ 1, Ψ0(A) = 1 for any (possibly empty) multi-set A, and for any
non-empty multi-set A = {α1, α2, ..., αℓ} and integer k ≥ 1,
Ψk(A) = k!
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤ℓ
k∏
t=1
αdt .
So, Ψk(A) is essentially the sum of all monomials of total degree k on the elements of A. Each term in
the sum has coefficient k!. Clearly, Ψ1(A) = L(A). For k ≥ 2, compare Ψk(A) with L(A)k which can
also be expressed as the sum of the same terms, albeit with different coefficients in {1, ..., k!}, given by the
multinomial theorem.
We are ready to define Ψ-games. A Ψ-game G of (integer) degree d ≥ 1 can be represented by the tuple
(N , E, (wu)u∈N , (Σu)u∈N , (ae,k)e∈E,k=0,1,...,d). Similarly to weighted congestion games, there is a set of n
players N and a set of resources E. Each player u has a weight wu and a set of available strategies Σu; each
strategy su ∈ Σu consists of a non-empty set of resources, i.e., su ⊆ 2E . Each resource e is associated with
d+1 non-negative numbers ae,k for k = 0, 1, ..., d. Again, for a state S, we define Ne(S) to be the multi-set
of weights of the players that use resource e at state S. Then, the cost of a player u at a state S is defined as
cˆu(S) = wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S)).
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Of course, the general definitions in the beginning of Section 2 apply also to Ψ-games. With some abuse in
notation, we also use 0 to refer to the pseudo-state in which no player selects any strategy and BRu(0) to
denote the best-response of player u assuming that no other player participates in the game.
Clearly, given a weighted congestion game with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d,
there is a corresponding Ψ-game with degree d, i.e., the one with the same sets of players, resources, and
strategy sets, and parameter ae,k for each resource e and integer k = 0, 1, ..., d equal to the corresponding
coefficient of the latency function fe. Observe that Ψ-games of degree 1 are linear weighted congestion
games. As we will see below, in a sense, a Ψ-game of degree d ≥ 2 is an approximation of its corresponding
weighted congestion game.
We remark here that a different approximation of weighted congestion games has been recently con-
sidered by Kollias and Roughgarden [23]. Given a weighted congestion game, they define a new game by
answering the following question: how should the product of the total weight of the players that use the
resource times its latency be shared as cost among these players so that the resulting game is a potential
game? Their games use a different sharing than the weight-proportional one used by weighted congestion
games. In contrast, our approach is to define an artificial latency on each resource e (by replacing the term
ae,kL(Ne(S))
k with ae,kΨk(Ne(S)) in the latency functions) so that weight-proportional sharing yields a
potential game. This guarantees the relation between approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games
and Ψ-games presented in Lemma 3.4 below, which is crucial for our purposes.
Properties of Ψ-games. We begin with a very important property of Ψ-games.
Theorem 3.2 The function Φ(S) = ∑e∑dk=0 ae,kk+1Ψk+1(Ne(S)) is a potential function for Ψ-games of
degree d.
As a corollary, we conclude that the Nash dynamics of Ψ-games are acyclic; hence, these games admit
pure Nash equilibria. Recall that Ψ-games of degree 1 are linear weighted congestion games; for this specific
case, Theorem 3.2 has been proved in [17].
In the following, we study the relation between the approximation guarantee of a state for a Ψ-game and
its corresponding weighted congestion game with polynomial latency functions.
Claim 3.3 Consider a weighted congestion game with polynomial latency functions of degree d and its cor-
responding Ψ-game. Then, for each player u and state S, cu(S) ≤ cˆu(S) ≤ d!cu(S).
Using Claim 3.3, we can obtain a relation between approximate equilibria as well.
Lemma 3.4 Any ρ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium for a Ψ-game of degree d is a d!ρ-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium for the corresponding weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies.
Since pure Nash equilibria always exist in Ψ-games, the last statement (applied with ρ = 1) implies the
following.
Theorem 3.5 Every weighted congestion game with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d has
a d!-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Subgames and partial potentials. We now define restrictions of the potential function of Ψ-games. Given
a state S and a set of players A ⊆ N , we denote by NAe (S) the multiset of the weights of players in A that
use resource e in S. Then, we define
ΦA(S) =
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(N
A
e (S)).
6
We can think of ΦA as the potential of a subgame in which only the players of A participate.
We also use the notion of the partial potential to account for the contribution of subsets of players to the
potential function. Consider sets of players A and B with B ⊆ A ⊆ N . Then, the B-partial potential of the
subgame among the players in A is defined as
ΦAB(S) = Φ
A(S)− ΦA\B(S).
When A = N , we remove the superscript from partial potentials, i.e., ΦB(S) = ΦNB (S). Also, when B
is a singleton containing player u, we simplify the notation of the partial potential to ΦAu (S). Furthermore,
observe that ΦAA(S) = ΦA(S).
The next four claims present basic properties of partial potentials.
Claim 3.6 Let S be a state of a Ψ-game and let B ⊆ A ⊆ N . Then, ΦAB(S) ≤ ΦB(S).
Claim 3.7 Let A ⊆ N be a set of players and let S and S′ be states such that each player in A uses the same
strategy in S and S′. Then, for every set of players B ⊆ A, ΦAB(S) = ΦAB(S′).
Claim 3.8 Let S be a state of a Ψ-game and let u be a player. Then, Φu(S) = cˆu(S).
Claim 3.9 Let u be a player and A ⊆ N a set of players that contains u. Then, for any two states S and S′
that differ only in the strategy of player u, it holds that ΦA(S)− ΦA(S′) = cˆu(S)− cˆu(S′).
In particular, Claim 3.9 implies that the A-partial potential can be thought of as a potential function defined
over all states in which each player in N \ A uses the same strategy.
We proceed with the following interesting property that shows that the potential function of Ψ-games is
cost-revealing. It also implies that the potential of a state lower-bounds the total cost of all players.
Lemma 3.10 For every state S of a Ψ-game and any set of players A ⊆ N , it holds that ΦA(S) ≤∑
u∈A cˆu(S).
The stretch of the potential function. An important quantity for our purposes is the stretch of the potential
function of Ψ-games; a general definition that applies to every potential game follows.
Definition 3.11 Consider a potential game with a positive potential function Φ and let S∗ be the state of
minimum potential. The ρ-stretch of the potential function of the game is the maximum over all ρ-approximate
pure Nash equilibria S of the ratio Φ(S)/Φ(S∗).
The next two statements provide bounds on the ρ-stretch of the potential function of Ψ-games of degree
1 (i.e., linear weighted congestion games) and d ≥ 2, respectively.
Lemma 3.12 For every ρ ∈ [1, 11/10], the ρ-stretch of the potential function of a linear weighted congestion
game is at most 3+
√
5
2 + 6(ρ− 1).
Lemma 3.13 The ρ-stretch of the potential function of a Ψ-game of degree d ≥ 2 is at most ρ(ρ + 1)d(d +
1)d+1.
In the rest of the paper, we denote by θd(ρ) the upper bounds on the ρ-stretch given by Lemmas 3.12 and
3.13, namely θ1(ρ) = 3+
√
5
2 + 6(ρ − 1) and θd(ρ) = ρ(ρ + 1)d(d + 1)d+1. The next lemma extends these
bounds to partial potentials.
Lemma 3.14 Consider a Ψ-game of degree d and a state S which is a ρ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium
for a set of players R ⊆ N . Then, ΦR(S) ≤ θd(ρ)ΦR(S∗) for any state S∗ such that each player in N \ R
uses the same strategy in S and S∗.
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4 The algorithm
In this section we describe our algorithm (Algorithm 1; see the table below). The algorithm takes as input a
Ψ-game G of degree d with n players, an arbitrary initial state S of the game, and a small positive parameter
γ. It produces as output a state of G. The algorithm starts by initializing its parameters, namely cˆmax, cˆmin, m,
g, q, and p (lines 1-6). It first computes the minimum possible cost cˆmin among all players and the maximum
cost cˆmax experienced by players in the initial state S. Then, it sets the parameter m equal to log (cˆmax/cˆmin);
in this way, m is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game (i.e., polynomial in the
number of bits necessary to store the parameters ae,k and the weights of the players). Then, the parameter q is
set close to 1 (namely, q = 1+γ) and parameter p is set close to θd(q) (namely, p =
(
1
θd(q)
− 2γ
)−1
). Recall
that θd(q) is the bound on the q-stretch of the potential function of Ψ-games of degree d in the statements of
Lemmas 3.12 (for d = 1) and 3.13 (for d ≥ 2).
input : A Ψ-game G of degree d with a set N of n players, an arbitrary initial state S, and
γ > 0 with γ ∈ (0, 1/10] if d = 1 and γ ∈ (0, 18θd(2) ], otherwise
output: A state of G
1 cˆmin ← minu∈N cˆu(0−u,BRu(0));
2 cˆmax ← maxu∈N cˆu(S);
3 m← log (cˆmax/cˆmin);
4 g ← 2 (1 +m(1 + γ−1))d ddnγ−3;
5 q ← 1 + γ;
6 p←
(
1
θd(q)
− 2γ
)−1
;
7 for i← 0 to m do bi ← cˆmaxg−i;
8 while there exists a player u ∈ N such that cˆu(S) ∈ [b1,+∞) and
cˆu(S−u,BRu(S)) < cˆu(S)/q do
9 S ← (S−u,BRu(S));
10 end
11 F ← ∅;
12 for phase i← 1 to m− 1 do
13 while there exists a player u ∈ N \ F such that either cˆu(S) ∈ [bi,+∞) and
cˆu(S−u,BRu(S)) < cˆu(S)/p or cˆu(S) ∈ [bi+1, bi) and cˆu(S−u,BRu(S)) < cˆu(S)/q
do
14 S ← (S−u,BRu(S));
15 end
16 F ← F ∪ {u ∈ N \ F : cˆu(S) ∈ [bi,+∞)};
17 end
Algorithm 1: Computing approximate equilibria in Ψ-games.
Then, the algorithm runs a sequence of phases; within each phase, it coordinates best-response moves of
the players. This process starts (line 7) by computing a decreasing sequence of boundaries b0, b1, b2, ..., bm
that will be used to define the sets of players that are considered to move within each phase. Then, it executes
phase 0 (lines 8-10). During this phase, as long as there are players of cost at least b1 that have a q-move, they
play a best-response strategy. Hence, after the end of the phase, all players with cost higher than b1 are in a
q-approximate equilibrium. Then, the algorithm uses set F to keep the players whose strategies have been
irrevocably decided; F is initialized to ∅ in line 11. Phases 1 to m − 1 (lines 12-17) constitute the heart of
our algorithm. During each such phase i, the algorithm repeatedly checks whether, in the current state, there
8
is a player that either has cost higher than bi that has a p-move or her cost is in [bi+1, bi) and has a q-move.
While such a player is found, she deviates to her best-response strategy. The phase terminates when no
such player exists and the algorithm irrevocably decides the strategy of the players that have cost at least bi.
These players are included in set F ; at this point, they are guaranteed to be at a p-approximate equilibrium.
Subsequent moves by other players may either increase their cost or decrease the cost they could experience
by deviating to another strategy. As we will show, these changes are not significant and each player will still
be at an almost p-approximate equilibrium at the end of all phases. The fact that plays a crucial role towards
proving such a claim is that, at the end of each phase i, any player with cost in [bi+1, bi) is guaranteed to be
in a q-approximate equilibrium. Note that bm ≤ cˆmin and, eventually, all players will be included in set F .
We remark that the sequence of the phases is similar to the one in our algorithm for unweighted conges-
tion games with polynomial latency functions of constant degree d in [7]. However, there is an important
difference. In that context, each player is considered to move during only two consecutive phases; these
phases are defined statically based only on the characteristics of the particular player. The main reason that
allows this is that the cost that a player may experience by following a specific strategy may change by at
most a polynomial factor (namely, at most nd) during the execution of the algorithm. This is not the case in
the context of Ψ-games since the fact that the cost of a player depends on the weights of the other players
does not satisfy this polynomial relation. So, in the current algorithm, the players that are considered to move
within each phase are decided dynamically based on the cost they experience during a phase. In this way, a
player may (be considered to) move in many different phases.
Below, we will prove the following statement.
Theorem 4.1 Algorithm 1 computes a ρˆd-approximate equilibrium for every Ψ-game of constant degree d,
where ρˆ1 = 3+
√
5
2 + O(γ) and ρˆd ∈ dd+o(d). The running time is polynomial in γ−1 and in the number of
bits in the representation of the game.
Combined with Lemma 3.4, Theorem 4.1 immediately yields the following result for weighted congestion
games.
Theorem 4.2 When Algorithm 1 is applied to the Ψ-game corresponding to a weighted congestion game with
polynomial latency functions of constant degree d, it computes a state which is a ρd-approximate equilibrium
for the latter, where ρ1 = 3+
√
5
2 +O(γ) and ρd ∈ d2d+o(d) for d ≥ 2.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 4.1. Throughout the section we consider the
application of the algorithm on a Ψ-game of degree d and denote by Si the state computed by the algorithm
after the execution of phase i for i = 0, 1, ...,m − 1. Also, we use Ri to denote the set of players that make
at least one move during phase i. Our arguments are split in three parts. First, we present a key property
maintained by our algorithm stating that the Ri-partial potential is small when the phase i ≥ 1 starts. Then,
we use this fact together with the parameters of the algorithm to prove that the running time is polynomial.
The proof of the approximation guarantee follows. Recall that the players whose strategies are irrevocably
decided during phase j ≥ 1 are at a p-approximate equilibrium at the end of the phase. The purpose of the
third part of the proof is to show that for each such player, neither her cost increases significantly nor the
cost she would experience by deviating to another strategy decreases significantly after phase j. Hence, the
approximation guarantee in the final state computed by the algorithm is slightly higher than p.
We remark that the analysis follows the same general steps as in our recent paper on unweighted con-
gestion games [7]. However, due to the definition of Ψ-games and the dependency of players’ cost on the
weights, different and significantly more involved arguments are required, especially in the first and third
step.
The key property maintained by our algorithm is the following.
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Lemma 4.3 For every phase i ≥ 1, it holds that ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ γ−1nbi.
We will now use Lemma 4.3 and the properties of Ψ-games to prove that the algorithm terminates quickly.
Lemma 4.4 The algorithm terminates after a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of bits in the
representation of the game and γ−1.
Proof. Clearly, if the number of strategies is polynomial in the number of resources, computing a best-
response strategy for a player u can be trivially performed in polynomial time (by the definition of cˆu). This
is also the case for weighted congestion games in networks (where the number of strategies of a player can
be exponential) using a shortest path computation. So, it remains to bound the total number of player moves.
At the initial state, the total cost of the players and, consequently (by Lemma 3.10), its potential is at
most ncˆmax. Each of the players that move during phase 0 decreases her cost and, consequently (by Theorem
3.2), the potential by at least (q − 1)b1 = γg−1cˆmax. Hence, the total number of moves in phase 0 is at
most nγ−1g. For i ≥ 1, we have ΦRi(Si) ≤ nbiγ−1 (by Lemma 4.3). Each of the players in Ri that
move during phase i decreases her cost and, consequently (by Claim 3.9), the Ri-partial potential by at least
(q − 1)bi+1 = big−1γ. Hence, phase i completes after at most ngγ−2 moves. In total, we have at most
mngγ−2 moves. The theorem follows by observing that g depends polynomially on m, n, and γ−1. ⊓⊔
It remains to prove that our algorithm computes approximate equilibria. Our proofs will exploit Lemma
4.3 as well as the following lemma which relates the cost of a player in a state to the partial potential of two
different subgames.
Lemma 4.5 Consider a Ψ-game of degree d, a player u and a set of players R ⊆ N \ {u}. Then, for every
state S and every ǫ > 0, it holds that
cˆu(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)ΦN\Ru (S) + ξǫΦN\{u}R (S),
where ξǫ = (1 + 1/ǫ)ddd − 1.
Using Lemmas 4.3 and 4.5, we will show that neither the cost of a player increases significantly after
the phase at the end of which her strategy was irrevocably decided (in Lemma 4.6), nor the cost she would
experience by deviating to another strategy decreases significantly (in Lemma 4.7).
Lemma 4.6 Let u be a player whose strategy was irrevocably decided at phase j. Then, cˆu(Sm−1) ≤
(1 + 2γ)cˆu(S
j).
Proof. For every i > j and ǫ > 0, we apply Lemma 4.5 for strategy Si, player u, and the set of players Ri
that move during phase i to obtain
cˆu(S
i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)ΦN\Riu (Si) + ξǫΦN\{u}Ri (Si)
= (1 + ǫ)ΦN\Riu (S
i−1) + ξǫΦ
N\{u}
Ri
(Si)
≤ (1 + ǫ)Φu(Si−1) + ξǫΦRi(Si)
≤ (1 + ǫ)cˆu(Si−1) + ξǫΦRi(Si−1).
The equality holds by Claim 3.7 since the players inN\Ri do not move during phase i. The second inequality
follows by Claim 3.6. The last one follows by Claim 3.8 and since the Ri-partial potential decreases during
phase i.
We now set ǫ = (1 + γ)1/m − 1. This implies that (1 + ǫ)m = 1 + γ. Also, by Claim A.2 (in
Appendix A), we get ǫ ≥ γm(1 + γ)1/m−1 ≥ (m(1 + γ−1))−1 and, by the definition of the parameters g
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and γ, ξǫ = (1 +m(1 + γ−1))ddd − 1 ≤ gγ
3
2n ≤ gγ2(1+γ−1)n . Using the above inequality together with these
observations, we obtain
cˆu(S
m−1) ≤ (1 + ǫ)m−1−j cˆu(Sj) + ξǫ
m−1∑
i=j+1
(1 + ǫ)m−1−iΦRi(S
i−1)
≤ (1 + ǫ)mcˆu(Sj) + (1 + ǫ)mξǫ
m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(S
i−1)
≤ (1 + γ)cˆu(Sj) + (1 + γ)ξǫ
m−1∑
i=j+1
nbiγ
−1
= (1 + γ)cˆu(S
j) + (1 + γ−1)ξǫnbj
m−1−j∑
i=1
g−i
≤ (1 + γ)cˆu(Sj) + 2(1 + γ−1)ξǫnbjg−1
≤ (1 + γ)cˆu(Sj) + γbj
≤ (1 + 2γ)cˆu(Sj).
The second inequality is obvious, the third one follows by Lemma 4.3 and by the relation between ǫ and
γ, the equality follows by the definition of bi, the fourth inequality follows since g ≥ 2 which implies that∑
i≥1 g
−i ≤ 2g−1, the fifth one follows by our observation about ξǫ above, and the last one follows since, by
the definition of the algorithm, the fact that the strategy of player u is irrevocably decided at phase j implies
that cˆu(Sj) ≥ bj . ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.7 Let u be a player whose strategy was irrevocably decided at phase j and let s′u be any of her
strategies. Then, cˆu(Sm−1−u , s′u) ≥ (1− 2γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u).
We are now ready to use the last two lemmas in order to prove the approximation guarantee of the
algorithm. This will complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.8 Given a Ψ-game of degree d, the algorithm computes a ρˆd-approximate equilibrium with ρˆ1 ≤
3+
√
5
2 +O(γ) and ρˆd ≤ dd+o(d).
5 Conclusions and open problems
Due to lack of space, the modification of Algorithm 1 that yields our structural result for weighted congestion
games with superlinear latency functions is presented in Appendix D.
Our work reveals interesting open problems. The obvious one is whether approximate equilibria with a
better approximation guarantee can be computed in polynomial time. We believe that our techniques have
reached their limits for linear weighted congestion games. However, in the case of superlinear latency func-
tions, approximations of weighted congestion games by potential games different than Ψ-games might yield
improved (existential or algorithmic) approximation guarantees. On the conceptual level, it is interesting to
further explore applications of approximations of non-potential games by potential ones like the one we have
exploited in the current paper.
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A Two technical inequalities
The following technical inequalities are extensively used in our proofs and are included here for easy refer-
ence.
Lemma A.1 (Minkowski inequality) ∑st=1 (αt + βt)k ≤ ((∑st=1 αkt )1/k + (∑st=1 βkt )1/k)k, for any in-
teger k ≥ 1 and αt, βt ≥ 0.
Claim A.2 For every α ∈ (0, 1) and z > 1, it holds that zα − 1 ≥ α(z − 1)zα−1.
Proof. The function h(x) = xα is concave in [1,+∞). This means that, for every z > 1, the line con-
necting points (1, 1) and (z, h(z)) has slope higher than the derivative of h at point z, i.e., zα−1z−1 ≥ αzα−1.
Equivalently, zα − 1 ≥ α(z − 1)zα−1. ⊓⊔
B Omitted proofs from Section 3
The following lemma is proved in (the full version of) [6] and is extensively used in our proofs.
Lemma B.1 For any integer k ≥ 1, any finite multi-set of non-negative reals A, and any non-negative real b
the following hold:
a. L(A)k ≤ Ψk(A) ≤ k!L(A)k d. Ψk(A ∪ {b}) −Ψk(A) = kbΨk−1(A ∪ {b})
b. Ψk−1(A)k ≤ Ψk(A)k−1 e. Ψk(A) ≤ kΨ1(A)Ψk−1(A)
c. Ψk(A ∪ {b}) =
∑k
t=0
k!
(k−t)!b
tΨk−t(A) f. Ψk(A ∪ {b}) ≤
(
Ψk({b})1/k +Ψk(A)1/k
)k
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Consider a player u, a state S in which u plays strategy su and state (S−u, s′u) where u has deviated to
strategy s′u. Using the definition of the potential function, we have
Φ(S)− Φ(S−u, s′u) =
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(Ne(S))−
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(Ne(S−u, s′u))
=
∑
e∈su\s′u
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(Ne(S))−Ψk+1(Ne(S−u, s′u))
)
+
∑
e∈s′u\su
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(Ne(S))−Ψk+1(Ne(S−u, s′u))
)
=
∑
e∈su\s′u
d∑
k=0
ae,kwuΨk(Ne(S))−
∑
e∈s′u\su
d∑
k=0
ae,kwuΨk(Ne(S−u, s′u))
= wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S))− wu
∑
e∈s′u
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S−u, s′u))
= cˆu(S)− cˆu(S−u, s′u).
The third equality follows by Lemma B.1d and the facts thatNe(S) = Ne(S−u, s′u)∪{wu} for every resource
e ∈ su \ s′u and Ne(S−u, s′u) = Ne(S) ∪ {wu} for every resource e ∈ s′u \ su. The last equality follows by
the definition of cˆu. ⊓⊔
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B.2 Proof of Claim 3.3
We will use Lemma B.1a and the definitions of cu(S) and cˆu(S). Let su be the strategy of player u at state
S. Using the first inequality of Lemma B.1a, we have
cu(S) = wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kL(Ne(S))
k ≤ wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S)) = cˆu(S).
Also, using the second inequality in Lemma B.1a, we have
cˆu(S) = wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S)) ≤ wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kk!L(Ne(S))
k ≤ d!wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kL(Ne(S))
k
= d!cu(S).
⊓⊔
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Let S be ρ-approximate equilibrium for a Ψ-game of degree d, u a player and s′u a strategy of u different than
her strategy su in S. Using the ρ-approximate equilibrium condition for player u and Claim 3.3, we have
cu(S) ≤ cˆu(S) ≤ ρcˆu(S−u, s′u) = d!ρ · cu(S−u, s′u).
⊓⊔
B.4 Proof of Claim 3.6
Let k ≥ 1 be an integer and consider a resource e which is used by at least one player of B in S. By the
definition of Ψk, observe that Ψk(NAe (S))−Ψk(NA\Be (S)) is equal to k! times the sum of all monomials of
degree k among the elements of NAe (S) that contain at least one element in NBe (S). Similarly, Ψk(Ne(S))−
Ψk(N
N\B
e (S)) is equal to k! times the sum of all monomials of degree k among the elements of Ne(S) that
contain at least one element in NBe (S). Since NAe (S) ⊆ Ne(S), we have that
Ψk(N
A
e (S))−Ψk(NA\Be (S)) ≤ Ψk(Ne(S))−Ψk(NN\Be (S)).
The inequality holds trivially (with equality) if no player from B uses resource e in S. Using this inequality
and the definition of the partial potential, we have
ΦAB(S) = Φ
A(S)− ΦA\B(S) =
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(N
A
e (S))−Ψk+1(NA\Be (S))
)
≤
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(Ne(S))−Ψk+1(NN\Be (S))
)
= Φ(S)− ΦN\B(S)
= ΦB(S).
⊓⊔
B.5 Proof of Claim 3.7
Observe that NA′e (S) = NA
′
e (S
′) for each resource e and any A′ ⊆ A. By the definition of the potential
of the subgame among the players of A′, we have ΦA′(S) = ΦA′(S′). Then, by the definition of the partial
potential, ΦAB(S) = ΦA(S)− ΦA\B(S) = ΦA(S′)−ΦA\B(S′) = ΦAB(S′). ⊓⊔
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B.6 Proof of Claim 3.8
Let su be the strategy of player u in S. We use the definition of the partial potential, the definitions of
the potential for the original game and the subgame among the players in N \ {u}, Lemma B.1d, and the
definition of cˆu(S) to obtain
Φu(S) = Φ(S)− ΦN\{u}(S) =
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(Ne(S))−Ψk+1(NN\{u}e (S))
)
=
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(Ne(S))−Ψk+1(NN\{u}e (S))
)
= wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S))
= cˆu(S).
⊓⊔
B.7 Proof of Claim 3.9
We have
ΦA(S)− ΦA(S′) = Φ(S)− ΦN\A(S)− Φ(S′) + ΦN\A(S′) = Φ(S)− Φ(S′) = cˆu(S)− cˆu(S′).
The first equality follows by the definition of the A-partial potential, the second one follows by Claim 3.7
since each player in N \ A uses the same strategy in S and S′ and the last one follows by Theorem 3.2. ⊓⊔
B.8 Proof of Lemma 3.10
Let A = {u1, u2, ..., u|A|}. Let A0 = ∅ and At = {u1, ..., ut} for t = 1, 2, ..., |A|. Then, using the definition
of the partial potential and Claims 3.6 and 3.8, we have
ΦA(S) = Φ(S)− ΦN\A(S) =
|A|∑
t=1
(
ΦN\At−1(S)− ΦN\At(S)
)
=
|A|∑
t=1
ΦN\At−1ut (S) ≤
|A|∑
t=1
Φut(S) =
∑
u∈A
cˆu(S).
⊓⊔
B.9 Proof of Lemma 3.12
Let S∗ be the state of minimum potential and S be a ρ-approximate equilibrium. For each player u, we denote
by su and s∗u the strategies she plays at states S and S∗, respectively. Using the ρ-approximate equilibrium
condition cu(S) ≤ ρ · cu(S−u, s∗u), the definition of the cost of player u, and the definition of function Ψ1,
we obtain ∑
u
cu(S) ≤ ρwu
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S−u, s∗u)) + ae,0)
≤ ρwu
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S) ∪ {wu}) + ae,0)
= ρwu
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S)) + ae,1wu + ae,0).
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By summing over all players, by exchanging sums, and using the definition of Ne(S∗), we obtain∑
u
cu(S) ≤ ρ
∑
u
wu
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S)) + ae,1wu + ae,0)
= ρ
∑
e

ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S)) ∑
u:e∈s∗u
wu + ae,1
∑
u:e∈s∗u
w2u + ae,0
∑
u:e∈s∗u
wu


= ρ
∑
e

ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))Ψ1(Ne(S∗)) + ae,1 ∑
u:e∈s∗u
w2u + ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S
∗))

.
We now apply the inequality xy ≤
√
5−1
2(3−√5)y
2 +
√
5−2
3−√5x
2 that holds for any pair of non-negative x and y on
the rightmost part of the above derivation to obtain∑
u
cu(S)
≤ ρ
∑
e

 √5− 1
2(3−√5)ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S
∗))2 +
√
5− 2
3−√5ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))
2 + ae,1
∑
u:e∈s∗u
w2u + ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S
∗))


= ρ
∑
e

 5−√5
4(3−√5)ae,1

Ψ1(Ne(S∗))2 + ∑
u:e∈s∗u
w2u

+ ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S∗))


−ρ
∑
e
7− 3√5
4(3 −√5)ae,1

Ψ1(Ne(S∗))2 − ∑
u:e∈s∗u
w2u

+
√
5− 2
3−√5q
∑
e
ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))
2.
Now, observe that Ψ1(Ne(S∗))2 ≥
∑
u:e∈s∗u w
2
u for every resource e. Furthermore, Ψ1(Ne(S∗))2 +∑
u:e∈s∗u w
2
u = Ψ2(Ne(S
∗)). Hence, we have
∑
u
cu(S) ≤ ρ
∑
e
(
5−√5
4(3−√5)ae,1Ψ2(Ne(S
∗)) + ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S∗))
)
+
√
5− 2
3−√5ρ
∑
e
ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))
2
≤ 5−
√
5
2(3 −√5)ρ
∑
e
(ae,1
2
Ψ2(Ne(S
∗)) + ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S∗))
)
+
√
5− 2
3−√5ρ
∑
e
ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))
2
=
5−√5
2(3 −√5)ρΦ(S
∗) +
√
5− 2
3−√5ρ
∑
e
ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))
2. (1)
We now use the definition of Φ(S), the fact that for every player u and resource e ∈ su, it holds that
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wu ≤ Ψ1(Ne(S)), and the definition of the cost of player u. We have
Φ(S) =
∑
e
(ae,1
2
Ψ2(Ne(S)) + ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S))
)
=
∑
e
(
ae,1
2
∑
u:e∈su
(
wuΨ1(Ne(S)) + w
2
u
)
+ ae,0
∑
u:e∈su
wu
)
≤
∑
e
(
ae,1
2
∑
u:e∈su
(
(6− 2
√
5)wuΨ1(Ne(S)) + (2
√
5− 4)w2u
)
+ ae,0
∑
u:e∈su
wu
)
= (3−
√
5)
∑
u
wu
∑
e∈su
(ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S)) + ae,0) + (
√
5− 2)
∑
e
ae,1
∑
u:e∈su
w2u
+(
√
5− 2)
∑
e
ae,0
∑
u:e∈su
wu
= (3−
√
5)
∑
u
cu(S) + (
√
5− 2)
∑
e
ae,1
∑
u:e∈su
w2u + (
√
5− 2)
∑
e
ae,0
∑
u:e∈su
wu.
By applying inequality (1) to the rightmost part of this derivation, we obtain
Φ(S) ≤ 5−
√
5
2
ρΦ(S∗) + (
√
5− 2)ρ
∑
e
ae,1Ψ1(Ne(S))
2 + (
√
5− 2)
∑
e
ae,1
∑
u:e∈su
w2u
+(
√
5− 2)
∑
e
ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S))
≤ 5−
√
5
2
ρΦ(S∗) + (2
√
5− 4)ρ
∑
e
(
ae,1
2
(
Ψ1(Ne(S))
2 +
∑
u:e∈su
w2u
)
+ ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S))
)
=
5−√5
2
ρΦ(S∗) + (2
√
5− 4)ρ
∑
e
(ae,1
2
Ψ2(Ne(S)) + ae,0Ψ1(Ne(S))
)
=
5−√5
2
ρΦ(S∗) + (2
√
5− 4)ρΦ(S).
The last inequality implies that Φ(S) is not larger than (5−
√
5)ρ
2(1−(2√5−4)ρ)Φ(S
∗) which can be easily proved to be
at most
(
3+
√
5
2 + 6(ρ − 1)
)
Φ(S∗) when ρ ∈ [1, 11/10]. ⊓⊔
B.10 Proof of Lemma 3.13
Consider a ρ-approximate equilibrium S of a Ψ-game and let S∗ be the state of minimum potential. We
denote by su and s∗u the strategy of player u at states S and S∗, respectively.
By Lemma 3.10, the ρ-approximate equilibrium condition cˆu(S) ≤ ρ · cˆu(S−u, s∗u), and the definition of
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the potential function, we have
1
ρ
Φ(S) ≤ 1
ρ
∑
u
cˆu(S)
≤
∑
u
cˆu(S−u, s∗u)
=
∑
u
wu
∑
e∈s∗u
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S−u, s∗u))
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
∑
u:e∈s∗u
wuΨk(Ne(S−u, s∗u)).
We now use the fact that Ne(S−u, s∗u) ⊆ Ne(S) ∪ {wu}, Lemma B.1c, and the fact that Ψt+1(Ne(S∗)) ≥
(t+ 1)!
∑
u:e∈s∗u w
t+1
u to obtain
1
ρ
Φ(S) ≤
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
∑
u:e∈s∗u
wuΨk(Ne(S) ∪ {wu})
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
∑
u:e∈s∗u
wu
k∑
t=0
k!
(k − t)!Ψk−t(Ne(S))w
t
u
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k∑
t=0
k!
(k − t)!Ψk−t(Ne(S))
∑
u:e∈s∗u
wt+1u
≤
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k∑
t=0
k!
(k − t)!(t+ 1)!Ψk−t(Ne(S))Ψt+1(Ne(S
∗))
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
k+1∑
t=1
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψk+1−t(Ne(S))Ψt(Ne(S∗)).
Using Lemma B.1b (observe that it implies that Ψt(A) ≤ Ψk+1(A)
t
k+1 for any non-negative integer t ≤ k+1
and multi-set of reals A), the binomial theorem, inequality αλ + βλ ≤ (α + β)λ for every α, β ≥ 0 and
λ ≥ 1, and the definition of the potential function, we obtain
1
ρ
Φ(S) ≤
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
k+1∑
t=1
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψk+1(Ne(S))
k+1−t
k+1 Ψk+1(Ne(S
∗))
t
k+1
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
((
Ψk+1(Ne(S))
1
k+1 +Ψk+1(Ne(S
∗))
1
k+1
)k+1
−Ψk+1(Ne(S))
)
≤
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
Ψk+1(Ne(S))
1
d+1 +Ψk+1(Ne(S
∗))
1
d+1
)d+1 − Φ(S).
We now apply Minkowski inequality twice on the double sum at the rightmost part of this last inequality and
19
use the definition of the potential function to obtain
(1 + 1/ρ)Φ(S) ≤
∑
e

( d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(Ne(S))
) 1
d+1
+
(
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(Ne(S
∗))
) 1
d+1


d+1
≤


(∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(Ne(S))
) 1
d+1
+
(∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(Ne(S
∗))
) 1
d+1


d+1
=
(
(Φ(S))
1
d+1 + (Φ(S∗))
1
d+1
)d+1
.
The above inequality yields
(Φ(S))
1
d+1 ≤ 1
(1 + 1/ρ)
1
d+1 − 1
(Φ(S∗))
1
d+1 . (2)
By Claim A.2, we have (1+1/ρ)
1
d+1 −1 ≥
(
ρ
1
d+1 (ρ+ 1)
d
d+1 (d+ 1)
)−1
. Using this observation, inequality
(2) implies that
Φ(S) ≤ ρ(ρ+ 1)d(d+ 1)d+1Φ(S∗)
as desired. ⊓⊔
B.11 Proof of Lemma 3.14
In our proof, we will use the property
Ψk(A ∪B) =
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Ψk−t(A)Ψt(B) (3)
for every two multi-sets of positive reals A and B. To see why (3) holds, observe that the product
Ψk−t(A)Ψt(B) equals (k − t)!t! times the sum of all products of monomials of degree k − t with elements
of A with monomials of degree t with elements of B.
Given state S in the original game, we define the Ψ-game (R, (wu)u∈R, (Σu)u∈R, (a¯e,t)e∈E,t=0,...,d) with
a¯e,t =
d∑
k=t
ae,k
(
k
t
)
Ψk−t(NN\Re (S)).
Observe that the parameters a¯e,k depend only on the strategies of players in N \R in S.
Now, given any state S′ in the original game, we denote by S¯′ the state in the new game in which each
player in R uses the strategy she uses in S′. We also use the notation c¯u for the cost of a player u ∈ R in the
new game and Φ¯ for its potential function.
We will first show that c¯u(S¯′) = cˆu(S′) for every state S¯′ of the new game such that each player u ∈ N\R
uses the same strategy in S′ and S. Consequently, since state S is a ρ-approximate equilibrium for the players
in R in the original game, state S¯ is a ρ-approximate equilibrium in the new game. We have
c¯u(S¯
′) = wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
t=0
a¯e,tΨt(Ne(S¯
′)) = wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
t=0
Ψt(N
R
e (S
′))
d∑
k=t
ae,k
(
k
t
)
Ψk−t(NN\Re (S))
= wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Ψk−t(NN\Re (S
′))Ψt(NRe (S
′)) = wu
∑
e∈su
d∑
k=0
ae,kΨk(Ne(S
′))
= cˆu(S
′).
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The first equality follows by the definition of c¯u(S¯′), the second one follows since Ne(S¯′) = NRe (S′) and
by the definition of a¯e,k, the third one follows by exchanging the sums and since each player in N \ R use
the same strategy in states S and S′ (hence, NN\Re (S) = NN\Re (S′)), the fourth one follows by equality (3),
and the last one follows by the definition of cˆu(S′).
We now show that Φ¯(S¯′) = ΦR(S′). We have
Φ¯(S¯′) =
∑
e
d∑
t=0
a¯e,t
t+ 1
Ψt+1(Ne(S¯
′))
=
∑
e
d∑
t=0
Ψt+1(N
R
e (S
′))
d∑
k=t
ae,k
k!
(t+ 1)!(t− k)!Ψk−t(N
N\R
e (S))
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
k∑
t=0
(
k + 1
t+ 1
)
Ψk−t(NN\Re (S
′))Ψt+1(NRe (S
′))
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
k+1∑
t=1
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψk+1−t(NN\Re (S
′))Ψt(NRe (S
′))
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
(
k+1∑
t=0
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψk+1−t(NN\Re (S
′))Ψt(NRe (S
′))−Ψk+1(NN\Re (S′))
)
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(N
R
e (S
′))−
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(N
N\R
e (S
′))
= Φ(S′)− ΦN\R(S′)
= ΦR(S
′).
The first equality follows by the definition of Φ¯(S¯′), the second one follows since Ne(S¯′) = NRe (S′) and by
the definition of a¯e,k, the third one follows by exchanging the sums and since each player in N \ R use the
same strategy in states S and S′, the fourth one follows by simply changing the counter in the rightmost sum,
the fifth one is obvious, the sixth one follows by property (3), and the last two ones follow by the definition
of the (partial) potentials.
Since the state S¯ is a ρ-approximate equilibrium for the new game, the bounds on the ρ-stretch established
in Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13 imply that Φ¯(S¯) ≤ θd(ρ)Φ¯(S¯∗). By our last equality above, we obtain that
ΦR(S) ≤ θd(ρ)ΦR(S∗) and the proof is complete. ⊓⊔
C Omitted proofs from Section 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
In order to prove the key property maintained by our algorithm, we will need the following lemma which
relates the Ri-partial potential to the cost they experience when they make their last move within phase i.
Lemma C.1 Let cˆ(u) denote the cost of player u ∈ Ri just after making her last move within phase i ≥ 1.
Then,
ΦRi(S
i) ≤
∑
u∈Ri
cˆ(u).
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Proof. Rename the players in Ri as u1, u2, ..., u|Ri| so that uj is the j-th player that performed her last move
within phase i ≥ 1. Also, denote by Si,j the state in which player uj performed her last move. Let R|Ri|i = ∅
and Rji = {uj+1, uj+2..., u|Ri|} for j = 0, 1, 2, ..., |Ri | − 1. Then,
ΦRi(S
i) = Φ(Si)−ΦN\Ri(Si) =
|Ri|∑
j=1
(
ΦN\R
j
i (Si)− ΦN\Rj−1i (Si)
)
=
|Ri|∑
j=1
Φ
N\Rji
uj (S
i)
=
|Ri|∑
j=1
Φ
N\Rji
uj (S
i,j) ≤
|Ri|∑
j=1
Φuj(S
i,j) =
∑
u∈Ri
cˆ(u).
The first three inequalities follow by the definition of the partial potential functions and the definition of sets
Rji . The fourth inequality follows by Claim 3.7 since players in N \Rji do not move after state Si,j and until
the end of the phase. The inequality follows by Claim 3.6 and the last equality follows by Claim 3.8 and the
definition of cˆ(u). ⊓⊔
We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 4.3. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that ΦRi(Si−1) >
γ−1nbi and we denote by Pi and Qi the set of players in Ri whose last move was a p-move and q-move,
respectively. Since each player in Pi decreases her cost by at least (p − 1)cˆ(u) during her last move within
phase i (see Claim 3.9), we have
ΦRi(S
i) ≤ ΦRi(Si−1)− (p − 1)
∑
u∈Pi
cˆ(u).
By Lemma C.1 and the fact that each player in Qi experiences a cost of at most bi when she makes her last
move within phase i, we have∑
u∈Pi
cˆ(u) ≥ ΦRi(Si)−
∑
u∈Qi
cˆ(u) ≥ ΦRi(Si)− nbi.
Using the last two inequalities and our assumption, we obtain that
ΦRi(S
i) ≤ ΦRi(Si−1)− (p− 1)ΦRi(Si) + (p− 1)nbi
< (1 + (p − 1)γ)ΦRi(Si−1)− (p − 1)ΦRi(Si)
which implies that
ΦRi(S
i) <
(
1
p
+ γ
)
ΦRi(S
i−1).
Now, consider state Si−1 and let Xi and Yi be the sets of players in Ri with cost at least bi and smaller
than bi, respectively. Notice that, by the definition of phase i − 1, Si−1 is a q-approximate equilibrium for
the players in Xi. We construct a new Ψ-game of degree d among the players in N as follows. The new
game has all resources of the original game; the parameters ae,k for these resources are the same as in the
original game. In addition, the new game has a new resource eu for each player u ∈ Yi; the parameters for
this resource are aeu,0 = bi/wu and aeu,k = 0 for k = 1, ..., d. Each player in N \ Yi has the same set of
strategies in the two games. The strategy set of player u ∈ Yi consists of the strategy su she uses in Si−1 as
well as strategy s′u ∪ {eu} for each strategy s′u 6= su she has in the original game.
Let S¯i−1 be the state of the new game in which all players play their strategies in Si−1. Clearly, state S¯i−1
is a q-approximate equilibrium for the players in Xi. Also, at state S¯i−1, each player u ∈ Yi experiences a
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cost equal to the cost she experiences at state Si−1 of the original game, i.e., smaller than bi. In the new game,
any deviation of u would include resource eu and would increase the cost of player u to at least wuaeu,0 = bi.
Hence, S¯i−1 is a q-approximate equilibrium for the players of Yi as well. We use Φ¯ to denote the potential
of the new game. Since the players use the same strategies in states Si−1 and S¯i−1 and the parameters ae,k
of the original resources are the same in both games, we have Φ¯Ri(S¯i−1) = ΦRi(Si−1).
Now, let S¯i be the state in which each player in N \ Yi uses her strategy in Si and the strategies for the
players in Yi are defined as follows. Let u be a player of Yi and s′u be the strategy she uses at state Si of the
original game. Her strategy in state S¯i of the new game is s′u ∪ {eu} if s′u 6= su and su otherwise. Observe
that, by the definition of the partial potential, we have that the partial potential Φ¯Ri(S¯i) of the new game at
state S¯i is by at most
∑
u∈Yi aeu,0Ψ1(Neu(S¯
i)) ≤ nbi higher than the partial potential of the original game
at state Si (due to the contribution of the additional resources to the potential value). Hence,
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i) ≤ ΦRi(Si) + nbi <
(
1
p
+ 2γ
)
ΦRi(S
i−1) =
(
1
p
+ 2γ
)
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i−1) =
1
θd(q)
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i−1).
So, we have identified a state S¯i−1 of the new game which is a q-approximate equilibrium for the play-
ers in Ri and another state S¯i such that the players in N \ Ri use the same strategies in S¯i−1 and S¯i and
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i−1) > θd(q)Φ¯Ri(S¯i). This contradicts Lemma 3.14 and, subsequently, it also contradicts our assump-
tion ΦRi(Si−1) > γ−1nbi. The lemma follows. ⊓⊔
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.5
In order to prove the lemma, we will need the following technical claim.
Claim C.2 For any α, β ≥ 0 and integer d ≥ 1, it holds that (α+β)d+1 ≤ (1+ǫ)αd+1+(1+1/ǫ)dddβd+1.
Proof. Consider the function h(α) = (α + β)d+1 − (1 + ǫ)αd+1. By setting its derivative equal to 0, we
obtain that it is maximized for α = β
(
(1 + ǫ)1/d − 1)−1 to the value 1+ǫ
((1+ǫ)1/d−1)dβ
d+1
. By Claim A.2, we
have that (1 + ǫ)1/d − 1 ≥ ǫ
d(1+ǫ)1−1/d
. Hence, h(α) ≤ (1 + 1/ǫ)dddβd+1 as desired. ⊓⊔
Now, let k be an integer such that 1 ≤ k ≤ d + 1, A a multiset of reals, and b ≥ 0. Using Lemma B.1f,
inequality αλ + βλ ≤ (α+ β)λ for every α, β ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 1, and Claim C.2, we have
Ψk(A ∪ {b}) −Ψk(A) ≤
(
Ψk({b})1/k +Ψk(A)1/k
)k −Ψk(A)
≤
(
Ψk({b})
1
d+1 +Ψk(A)
1
d+1
)d+1 −Ψk(A)
≤ (1 + ǫ)Ψk({b}) + ξǫΨk(A). (4)
Also, let Q = N \ (R ∪ {u}) and define
δe,t =
d∑
k=max{t−1,0}
ae,k
k + 1
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψk+1−t(NQe (S))
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for each resource e and t = 0, 1, ..., d + 1. Also, let P be a possibly empty set such that P ⊆ R ∪ {u}. By
the definition of function Ψk+1 and by exchanging the sums, we have
ΦP∪Q(S) =
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
Ψk+1(N
P∪Q
e (S))
=
∑
e
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
k+1∑
t=0
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψt(N
P
e (S))Ψk+1−t(N
Q
e (S))
=
∑
e
d+1∑
t=0
Ψt(N
P
e (S))
d∑
k=max{t−1,0}
ae,k
k + 1
(
k + 1
t
)
Ψk+1−t(NQe (S))
=
∑
e
d+1∑
t=0
δe,tΨt(N
P
e (S)). (5)
By Claim 3.8 and the definition of the partial potential we have cˆu(S) = Φu(S) = Φ(S)− ΦN\{u}(S).
Using the alternative expression for the potentials Φ(S) and ΦN\{u}(S) (i.e., equality (5)) as well as inequal-
ity (4), we obtain
cˆu(S) =
∑
e
d+1∑
k=0
δe,k
(
Ψk(N
R∪{u}
e (S))−Ψk(NRe (S))
)
=
∑
e∈su
d+1∑
k=1
δe,k
(
Ψk(N
R∪{u}
e (S))−Ψk(NRe (S))
)
≤
∑
e∈su
d+1∑
k=1
δe,k
(
(1 + ǫ)Ψk(N
{u}
e (S)) + ξǫΨk(N
R
e (S))
)
.
The second equality follows since Ψ0(A) = 1 for every (possibly empty) multiset of reals A. Using the fact
again together with the fact Ψk(∅) = 0 for k ≥ 1, as well as the definitions of the potentials, we obtain
cˆu(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈su
d+1∑
k=0
δe,k
(
Ψk(N
{u}
e (S)) −Ψk(∅)
)
+ ξǫ
∑
e∈su
d+1∑
k=0
δe,k
(
Ψk(N
R
e (S))−Ψk(∅)
)
≤ (1 + ǫ)
∑
e
d+1∑
k=0
δe,k
(
Ψk(N
{u}
e (S)) −Ψk(∅)
)
+ ξǫ
∑
e
d+1∑
k=0
δe,k
(
Ψk(N
R
e (S))−Ψk(∅)
)
= (1 + ǫ)
(
ΦN\R(S)− ΦN\(R∪{u})(S)
)
+ ξǫ
(
ΦN\{u}(S)− ΦN\(R∪{u})(S)
)
= (1 + ǫ)ΦN\Ru (S) + ξǫΦ
N\{u}
R (S)
and the proof is complete. ⊓⊔
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C.3 Proof of Lemma 4.7
For every i > j and ǫ > 0, we apply Lemma 4.5 for state (Si−1−u , s′u), player u, and the set Ri of players that
move during phase i to obtain
cˆu(S
i−1
−u , s
′
u) ≤ (1 + ǫ)ΦN\Riu (Si−1−u , s′u) + ξǫΦN\{u}Ri (Si−1−u , s′u)
= (1 + ǫ)ΦN\Riu (S
i
−u, s
′
u) + ξǫΦ
N\{u}
Ri
(Si−1)
≤ (1 + ǫ)Φu(Si−u, s′u) + ξǫΦRi(Si−1)
= (1 + ǫ)cˆu(S
i
−u, s
′
u) + ξǫΦRi(S
i−1)
and, equivalently,
cˆu(S
i
−u, s
′
u) ≥
1
1 + ǫ
cˆu(S
i−1
−u , s
′
u)−
ξǫ
1 + ǫ
ΦRi(S
i−1).
The first equality in the derivation above follows by Claim 3.7 since the players in N \ Ri use the same
strategies in states (Si−1−u , s′u) and (Si−u, s′u) and since all players besides u use the same strategies in states
(Si−1−u , s′u) and Si−1. The second inequality follows by Claim 3.6 and the last equality follows by Claim 3.8.
We now set ǫ = (1 + γ)1/m − 1. This implies that (1 + ǫ)−m = (1 + γ)−1 ≥ 1 − γ. Also, by
Claim A.2, we get ǫ ≥ γm(1 + γ)1/m−1 ≥ (m(1 + γ−1))−1 and, by the definition of the parameter g,
ξǫ = (1+m(1+γ
−1)ddd−1 ≤ gγ32n . Using the above inequality together with these observations, we obtain
cˆu(S
m−1
−u , s
′
u) ≥ (1 + ǫ)j−m+1cˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− ξǫ
m−1∑
i=j+1
(1 + ǫ)i−m−2ΦRi(S
i−1)
≥ (1 + ǫ)−mcˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− ξǫ
m−1∑
i=j+1
ΦRi(S
i−1)
≥ (1− γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− ξǫ
m−1∑
i=j+1
nbiγ
−1
= (1− γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− ξǫnγ−1bj
m−1−j∑
i=1
g−i
≥ (1− γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− 2ξǫnγ−1bjg−1
≥ (1− γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− γ2bj
≥ (1− γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u)− γcˆu(Sj)/p
≥ (1− 2γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u).
The second inequality is obvious, the third inequality follows by Lemma 4.3 and by the relation between ǫ
and γ, the equality follows by the definition of bi, the fourth inequality follows since g ≥ 2 which implies
that
∑
i≥1 g
−i ≤ 2g−1, the fifth inequality follows by our observation about ξǫ above, the sixth inequality
follows since γ ≤ 1/p (this can be seen by inspecting the values of γ and p in the definition of the algorithm
and the bound on θd(1 + γ) provided by Lemma 3.13) and cˆu(Sj) is higher than bj when the strategy of
player u is irrevocably decided at the end of phase j, and the last inequality follows since player u has no
incentive to make a p-move at state Sj . ⊓⊔
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C.4 Proof of Lemma 4.8
Consider the application of the algorithm to a Ψ-game and let u be any player whose strategy is irrevocably
decided at the end of phase j of the algorithm. Also, let s′u be any other strategy of this player. By Lemmas
4.6 and 4.7 and since, by the definition of the algorithm, player u has no incentive to make a p-move at state
Sj , we have
cˆu(S
m−1)
cˆu(S
m−1
−u , s′u)
≤ (1 + 2γ)
(1− 2γ) ·
cˆu(S
j)
cˆu(S
j
−u, s′u)
≤ 1 + 2γ
1− 2γ
(
1
θd(1 + γ)
− 2γ
)−1
.
Hence, the right-hand side of the above inequality upper-bounds the approximation guarantee of the algo-
rithm. For d = 1, the parameter γ takes values in (0, 1/10]. Since γ ∈ (0, 1/10] and θ1(1+ γ) = 3+
√
5
2 +6γ
(see Lemma 3.12), by making simple calculations, we obtain that the algorithm computes a ρˆ1-approximate
equilibrium with
ρˆ1 ≤ 3 +
√
5
2
+ 110γ.
For larger values of d, the algorithm uses γ ∈ (0, 18θd(2) ]. Since θd(1 + γ) is non-decreasing in γ, we have
that
(
1
θd(1+γ)
− 2γ
)−1 ≤ 43θd(2). Also, we have that γ < 1/34 and hence 1+2γ1−γ ≤ 98 . By using the
value for θd(2) from Lemma 3.13, we have that the algorithm computes a ρˆd-approximate equilibrium with
ρˆd ≤ 3d+1(d+ 1)d+1 ∈ dd+o(d). ⊓⊔
D The structure of the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games with
superlinear latency functions
Algorithm 1 identifies a short sequence of best-response moves in the Ψ-game on input. When the degree
of the Ψ-game is higher than 1, the sequence may include non-improvement moves for the corresponding
weighted congestion game. In this section, we present an algorithm that is applied directly to a weighted
congestion game with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2. The algorithm (Algorithm
2, see the table below) is very similar to Algorithm 1; the main difference is that decisions are based on the
cost of the players in the original weighted congestion game (so cˆu in Algorithm 1 has been replaced by
cu in Algorithm 2). In addition, the parameters q and p used by Algorithm 2 are higher than the ones used
in Algorithm 1. The main reason is that the only available tool we have in order to guarantee convergence
to an approximate equilibrium is the potential function of the corresponding Ψ-game. Hence, parameters q
and p are sufficiently high so that the moves performed by Algorithm 2 are also improvement moves for the
corresponding Ψ-game. Due to technical reasons, γ is now restricted to smaller (but still constant) positive
values. We remark that, in the description of Algorithm 2, BRu denotes the best-response of player u in the
weighted congestion game.
The analysis of the algorithm will follow the same lines with the analysis of Algorithm 1. Again, the main
idea in the analysis is to show that the algorithm computes an approximate equilibrium for the corresponding
Ψ-game (with a slightly worse approximation guarantee) which is also an approximate equilibrium for the
original weighted congestion game. Our main statement for Algorithm 2 is the following.
Theorem D.1 For every weighted congestion game with polynomial latency functions of constant maximum
degree d ≥ 2, Algorithm 2 identifies a sequence of best-response moves from any initial state to a ρd-
approximate equilibrium, where ρd ∈ dO(d2). The length of the sequence is polynomial in γ−1 and in the
number of bits in the representation of the game.
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In the following, we consider the application of the algorithm on a weighted congestion game with
polynomial latency functions of degree d. We denote by Si the state computed by the algorithm after the
execution of phase i for i = 0, 1, ...,m − 1. Also, we use Ri to denote the set of players that make at least
one move during phase i. Similarly to the analysis of the algorithm for Ψ-games, we first aim to show that
the algorithm computes a dO(d2)-approximate equilibrium for the corresponding Ψ-game. Then, the result
will follow by Lemma 3.4.
input : A weighted congestion game G with polynomial latency functions of maximum
degree d with a set N of n players, an arbitrary initial state S, and
γ ∈ (0, (4 · d!θd(2(d!)2))−1]
output: A state of G
1 cmin ← minu∈N cu(0−u,BRu(0));
2 cmax ← maxu∈N cu(S);
3 m← log (cmax/cmin);
4 g ← 2 (1 +m(1 + γ−1))d ddnγ−3;
5 q ← d!(1 + γ);
6 p←
(
1
d!θd(d!q)
− 2γ
)−1
;
7 for i← 0 to m do bi ← cmaxg−i;
8 while there exists a player u ∈ N such that cu(S) ∈ [b1,+∞) and
cu(S−u,BRu(S)) < cu(S)/q do
9 S ← (S−u,BRu(S));
10 end
11 F ← ∅;
12 for phase i← 1 to m− 1 do
13 while there exists a player u ∈ N \ F such that either cu(S) ∈ [bi,+∞) and
cu(S−u,BRu(S)) < cu(S)/p or cu(S) ∈ [bi+1, bi) and cu(S−u,BRu(S)) < cu(S)/q
do
14 S ← (S−u,BRu(S));
15 end
16 F ← F ∪ {u ∈ N \ F : cu(S) ∈ [bi,+∞)};
17 end
Algorithm 2: Computing approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games with poly-
nomial latency functions.
Again, the proof will use the same arguments as before. First, we prove the key property that the Ri-
partial potential is small when the phase i ≥ 1 starts. Then, we use this fact together with the parameters
of the algorithm to prove that the running time is polynomial. The proof of the approximation guarantee for
the corresponding Ψ-game follows. Again, the purpose of the third part of the proof is to show that for each
player whose strategy is irrevocably decided at the end of phase j, neither her cost in the Ψ-game increases
significantly nor the cost she would experience by deviating to another strategy decreases significantly after
phase j. Hence, the approximation guarantee with respect to the Ψ-game in the final state computed by the
algorithm is slightly higher than p. In our proofs, we use the terms W -cost and Ψ-cost in order to distinguish
between the cost experienced by the players in the original weighted congestion game and the corresponding
Ψ-game.
We will use the following fact that follows by Claim 3.3.
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Claim D.2 Let G be a weighted congestion game with polynomial latency functions of degree d and G′ its
corresponding Ψ-game. A ρ-move in G is a ρ/d!-move in G′. A ρ-approximate equilibrium in G is a d!ρ-
approximate equilibrium in G′.
Proof. Let S be a state of G and consider the deviation of player u to strategy s′u which is a ρ-move. Then,
cˆu(S) ≥ cu(S) ≥ ρcu(S−u, s′u) ≥
ρ
d!
cˆu(S−u, s′u).
Now, assume that state S is a ρ-approximate equilibrium for G. For every player u and every strategy s′u, we
have
cˆu(S) ≤ d!cu(S) ≤ d!ρcu(S−u, s′u) ≤ d!ρcˆu(S−u, s′u),
i.e., S is a d!ρ-approximate equilibrium for game G′. ⊓⊔
Since the parameters q and p used by our algorithm are strictly higher than d!, the above claim immedi-
ately implies that the players that move in each step actually make an improvement move in the Ψ-game as
well.
D.1 Proving the key property
The key property maintained by Algorithm 2 is the following.
Lemma D.3 For every phase i ≥ 1 of Algorithm 2, it holds that ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ γ−1nbi.
Proof. In order to prove it, we will need Lemma C.1. Note that the proof of Lemma C.1 works for every
sequence of improvement moves by players in a set Ri in a Ψ-game and does not depend on any particular
algorithm. Since, in every phase i of Algorithm 2, the players of Ri do follow improvement moves in the
Ψ-game, the proof is valid in this case as well.
Now, the argument proceeds very similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.3. We include the full proof
here since many minor modifications are required. Again, for the sake of contradiction, we assume that
ΦRi(S
i−1) > γ−1nbi and we denote by Pi and Qi the set of players in Ri whose last move was a p-move
and q-move (in the weighted congestion game), respectively. By Claim D.2, each player in Pi decreases her
Ψ-cost by at least (p/d!− 1)cˆ(u) during her last move within phase i. Hence, we have
ΦRi(S
i) ≤ ΦRi(Si−1)− (p/d! − 1)
∑
u∈Pi
cˆ(u).
Now, observe that each player in Qi experiences a W -cost of at most bi when she makes her last move within
phase i, i.e., a Ψ-cost at most d!bi (by Claim 3.3). Using this fact and Lemma C.1, we have∑
u∈Pi
cˆ(u) ≥ ΦRi(Si)−
∑
u∈Qi
cˆ(u) ≥ ΦRi(Si)− d!nbi.
Using the last two inequalities and our assumption, we obtain that
ΦRi(S
i) ≤ ΦRi(Si−1)− (p/d! − 1)ΦRi(Si) + (p− d!)nbi
< (1 + (p− d!)γ)ΦRi(Si−1)− (p/d!− 1)ΦRi(Si)
which implies that
ΦRi(S
i) ≤ d!
(
1
p
+ γ
)
ΦRi(S
i−1).
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Now, we adapt the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4.3 in order to reach the desired contradiction.
Consider state Si−1 and let Xi and Yi be the sets of players in Ri with W -cost at least bi and smaller than
bi, respectively. Notice that, by the definition of phase i − 1 and Claim D.2, Si−1 is a d!q-approximate
equilibrium for the players in Xi (with respect to the Ψ-game). We construct a new Ψ-game of degree d
among the players in N as follows. The new game has all resources of the original game; the parameters ae,k
for these resources are the same as in the original game. In addition, the new game has a new resource eu for
each player u ∈ Yi; the parameters for this resource are aeu,0 = d!bi/wu and aeu,k = 0 for k = 1, ..., d. Each
player in N \ Yi has the same set of strategies in the two games. The strategy set of player u ∈ Yi consists of
the strategy su she uses in Si−1 as well as strategy s′u∪{eu} for each strategy s′u 6= su she has in the original
game.
Let S¯i−1 be the state of the new game in which all players play their strategies in Si−1. Clearly, state
S¯i−1 is a d!q-approximate equilibrium for the players in Xi (with respect to the Ψ-game). Also, at state S¯i−1,
each player u ∈ Yi experiences a Ψ-cost equal to the Ψ-cost she experiences at state Si−1 of the original
game, i.e., smaller than d!bi. In the new Ψ-game, any deviation of u would include resource eu and would
increase the Ψ-cost of player u to at least wuaeu,0 = d!bi. Hence, S¯i−1 is a d!q-approximate equilibrium for
the players of Yi as well. We use Φ¯ to denote the potential of the new Ψ-game. Since the players use the
same strategies in states Si−1 and S¯i−1 and the parameters ae,k of the original resources are the same in both
games, we have Φ¯Ri(S¯i−1) = ΦRi(Si−1).
Now, let S¯i be the state in which each player in N \ Yi uses her strategy in Si and the strategies for the
players in Yi are defined as follows. Let u be a player of Yi and s′u be the strategy she uses at state Si of the
original game. Her strategy in state S¯i of the new Ψ-game is s′u∪{eu} if s′u 6= su and su otherwise. Observe
that, by the definition of the partial potential, we have that the partial potential Φ¯Ri(S¯i) of the new Ψ-game
at state S¯i is by at most
∑
u∈Yi aeu,0Ψ1(Neu(S¯
i)) ≤ d!nbi higher than the partial potential of the original
Ψ-game at state Si (due to the contribution of the additional resources to the potential value). Using these
observations, our assumption, and the definition of parameter p, we have
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i) ≤ ΦRi(Si) + d!nbi < d!
(
1
p
+ 2γ
)
ΦRi(S
i−1) = d!
(
1
p
+ 2γ
)
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i−1) =
1
θd(d!q)
Φ¯Ri(S¯
i−1).
So, we have identified a state S¯i−1 of the new Ψ-game which is a d!q-approximate equilibrium for the
players in Ri and another state S¯i such that the players in N \ Ri use the same strategies in S¯i−1 and S¯i
and Φ¯Ri(S¯i−1) > θd(d!q)Φ¯Ri(S¯i). This contradicts Lemma 3.14 and, subsequently, it also contradicts our
assumption ΦRi(Si−1) > γ−1nbi. The lemma follows. ⊓⊔
D.2 Bounding the running time
We will now use Lemma D.3 and the properties of Ψ-games to prove that the algorithm terminates quickly.
Again, we assume that each player can efficiently compute her best-response strategy at any state (including
the pseudo-state 0).
Lemma D.4 Algorithm 2 terminates after a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of bits in the
representation of the game and γ−1.
Proof. At the initial state, the W-cost of each player is at most cmax. Hence, by Claim 3.3, the total Ψ-cost of
the players and, consequently (by Lemma 3.10), the potential of the initial state is at most d!ncˆmax. By Claim
D.2, each one of the players that move during phase 0 decreases her Ψ-cost and, consequently (by Theorem
3.2), the potential by at least (q/d! − 1)b1 = γg−1cˆmax. Hence, the total number of moves in phase 0 is at
most d!nγ−1g. For i ≥ 1, we have ΦRi(Si) ≤ nbiγ−1 (by Lemma D.3). By Claim D.2, each one of the
players in Ri that move during phase i decreases her Ψ-cost and, consequently (by Claim 3.9), the Ri-partial
29
potential by at least (q/d! − 1)bi+1 = big−1γ. Hence, phase i completes after at most ngγ−2 moves. In
total, we have at most mngγ−2 moves (since γ−1 ≥ d!). The theorem follows by observing that g depends
polynomially on m, n, and γ−1. ⊓⊔
D.3 Proving the approximation guarantee
The proof of the approximation guarantee will use the following lemma (it is analogous to Lemmas 4.6 and
4.7 in the analysis of Algorithm 1).
Lemma D.5 Let u be a player whose strategy was irrevocably decided at phase j of Algorithm 2 and let s′u
be any of her strategies. Then, cˆu(Sm−1) ≤ (1 + 2γ)cˆu(Sj) and cˆu(Sm−1−u , s′u) ≥ (1− 2γ)cˆu(Sj−u, s′u).
Proof. The proofs of the two parts are identical to the proofs of Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. All that
needs to be changed is the justification of two inequalities. At the end of the proof of Lemma 4.6, we used
the inequality bj ≤ cˆu(Sj). This holds in our case as well since the fact that the strategy of player u was
irrevocably decided at phase j implies that cu(S) ≥ bj and, by Claim 3.3, we also have cˆu(S) ≥ cu(S).
Similarly, at the end of the proof of Lemma 4.7, we used the inequalities γbj ≤ cˆu(Sj)/p ≤ cˆu(Sj−u, s′u).
What we need is essentially to show that inequality γbj ≤ cˆu(Sj−u, s′u) holds. We have
γbj ≤ γcu(Sj) ≤ cu(Sj)/p ≤ cu(Sj−u, s′u) ≤ cˆu(Sj−u, s′u).
The first inequality is due to the fact that the strategy of player u was irrevocably decided at phase j, the
second one follows since γ ≤ 1/p, the third one follows since, at state Sj , player u has no p-move in the
original weighted congestion game, and the last one follows by Claim 3.3. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to use the last lemma in order to prove the approximation guarantee. This will complete
the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma D.6 Algorithm 2 computes a dO(d2)-approximate equilibrium for the weighted congestion game on
input.
Proof. Consider the application of the algorithm and let u be any player whose strategy is irrevocably
decided at the end of phase j of the algorithm. Also, let s′u be any other strategy of this player. We will show
that cu(Sm−1) ≤ 6(d!)2θd(2(d!)2) ·cu(Sm−1−u , s′u); the lemma will then follow since the bound for θd(2(d!)2)
given by Lemma 3.13 is dO(d2). We have
cu(S
m−1)
cu(S
m−1
−u , s′u)
≤ d! cˆu(S
m−1)
cˆu(S
m−1
−u , s′u)
≤ d! (1 + 2γ)
(1− 2γ) ·
cˆu(S
j)
cˆu(S
j
−u, s′u)
≤ (1 + 2γ)
(1− 2γ) · d!p
= d!
1 + 2γ
1− 2γ
(
1
d!θd((1 + γ)(d!)2)
− 2γ
)−1
≤ d!1 + 2γ
1− 2γ
(
1
d!θd(2(d!)2)
− 2γ
)−1
≤ 2(d!)2 1 + 2γ
1− 2γ θd(2(d!)
2)
≤ 6(d!)2θd(2(d!)2).
30
The first inequality follows by Claim 3.3, the second one follows by Lemma D.5, the third one follows since,
at state Sj , player u has no p-move in the original weighted congestion game and, consequently (by Claim
D.2), no d!p-move in the Ψ-game, the equality follows by the definition of parameter p, the fourth inequality
follows since θd is non-decreasing, the fifth inequality follows by the definition of parameter γ, and the last
inequality follows since γ ≤ 1/4. ⊓⊔
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